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Voting for Women in Belgium’s Flexible List System  
 
Abstract 
Proportional electoral systems tend to be more beneficial for women’s descriptive representation than 
majority systems. However, within proportional systems the gender equality of election outcomes 
differs, highlighting the importance of studying the actual use of electoral provisions in PR-systems. 
Therefore, we investigate the determinants of voting for female candidates in Belgian’s local elections. 
This case is particularly interesting given the equal number of men and women on the candidate lists 
due to quota regulations, the possibility to cast multiple preference votes (lowering competition) and the 
high visibility of these local elections and its candidates. At the individual level, we find that women are 
more likely than men to vote for several women, yet same-sex voting is more common among men. 
Political sophisticated respondents vote more often on candidates of both sexes. Against our 
expectations, a left-wing orientation does not increase the likelihood to vote for women. At the electoral 
district level, a larger supply of women at the top list position increases the chance to vote for this top 
woman, but there is no spillover effect to women lower on the list. District magnitude affects the number 
of preferences votes but against expectations not the likelihood to vote for women. 
 
The socio-demographic representativeness of political institutions constitutes a topic that is high 
on the political agenda in a large number of countries across the globe. The underrepresentation of 
specific groups in political institutions is increasingly considered a democratic problem (Phillips 1995); 
therefore many countries have undertaken action, amongst others by implementing quota systems 
(Dahlerup 2007). The underrepresentation of women in parliaments has also been a topic of academic 
scrutiny for several decades. Pippa Norris (1996) made an important contribution to this literature by 
developing a common framework to examine the presence of women in parliaments. This framework 
focuses on three levels of analysis: the recruitment environment, the recruitment structures and the 
recruitment process.  
Previous research has shown that the electoral system, an essential element of the recruitment 
environment, has a large effect on the presence of women in parliaments (Norris 1996; Matland and 
Montgomery 2003). There seems to be a consensus among scholars that a system of proportional 
representation (PR) is more favorable for the election of women than a majority system (Norris 1996; 
Caul 1999; Matland and Montgomery 2003). However, there is a large variety in the gender equality of 
the outcomes of PR systems and in the ways actors use the institutional provisions of these electoral 
systems (Tremblay 2008). To gain a better understanding of the effect of the recruitment environment 
on the presence of women, we study preferential voting and how the use of preference votes influences 
the descriptive representation of women. 
Studies on how many preference votes female candidates obtain and what kind of voters are 
more likely to vote for them (and under which conditions) have mainly focused on the context of majority 
systems, in particular on the US context with a two-party system (e.g. Brians 2005; Dolan 2008; 
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McDermott 1997; Paolino 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Smith and Fox 2001). Only recently, some studies 
on voting for women in more proportional systems appeared (Giger et al. forthcoming; McElroy and 
Marsh 2010, 2011). The aim of this study is to contribute to this recent literature by investigating 
another type of PR system, i.e. Belgium’s flexible list system. In this electoral system voters can cast a 
vote for one or more candidates within one list or they can cast no preference vote but support the list 
as a whole (i.e. a list vote). Hence, voters can use their preferences votes to influence the presence of 
women in parliament in multiple ways: they can choose to vote for one or more female candidates, one 
or more male candidates or both female and male candidates.  
In addition to the specific nature of the preferential system, the 2012 local elections in Belgium 
are particularly interesting for yet three other reasons. First of all, quota legislation stipulates that in 
every municipality the number of female candidates is equal to that of male candidates. Hence, an 
important contextual variable (the number of female candidates in an electoral district) is held constant 
(McElroy and Marsh 2010). Moreover, in previous research a strong relation between the presence of 
female candidates and the ideology of a political party was found, making it difficult to assess whether 
voters deliberately choose to vote for women or whether the candidate of their preferred party just 
happened to be a woman (Dolan 2008). Given the equal (and large) supply of female candidates in 
Belgium, we are better able to disentangle the effect of sex and ideology on voting for female 
candidates. Second, Belgian voters are allowed to cast several preference votes thereby the 
competitiveness between candidates tends to be lower. This is likely to increase the chances of women 
candidates, as voters will be less likely to cast a strategic vote for men to increase the chances of 
gaining a seat for their preferred party. Likewise, we expect the number of seats available in a district 
(i.e. district magnitude) to be less important than in previous studies investigating electoral systems 
where voters are allowed to cast only one preference vote (Giger et al. forthcoming). Finally, contrary to 
most research on gender-based voting that focuses on low information contexts, this study investigates 
voting behavior in a high information context given that voters are often familiar with the candidates in 
the Belgian local elections (Deschouwer 2009). As a result, we expect information shortcuts that are 
important when information costs are high, such as the sex of the candidate, to be used less 
(McDermott 1997).  
In this article, we present the results of a thorough investigation of how preferential voting 
influences the descriptive representation of women in representative assemblies. In particular, we map 
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the frequency and analyze the determinants of voting for male, female or both male and female 
candidates. We study the characteristics of the voters (such as sex and ideology) as well as the 
characteristics of the electoral context (such as district magnitude). The analysis is based on the results 
of the 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll survey that was conducted in a random sample of 40 local 
municipalities in Belgium at the occasion of the 2012 local elections. Voters were interviewed face-to-
face right after they left the polling booth. After this interview, they were asked to cast their (preference) 
vote(s) again on a “mock ballot” (self-administered). This research design results in a unique dataset 
that contains extensive information on the preference votes of the respondents. 
In subsequent sections, we give an overview of the literature on gender-based voting which 
leads to five hypotheses. Next, we discuss in greater detail why Belgium is an interesting case to test 
these hypotheses. Subsequently, we describe the data and methodology and present the findings of 
this study. We close with a discussion of the main results. 
 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS  
An inclusive society, where the interests of all citizens receive equal consideration in the 
political process, serves as an important normative ideal for social scientists and policymakers. 
Inclusive legislatures are perceived as more legitimate (Thomas 1998) and also the quality of public 
policy increases when all relevant perspectives and interests are taken up in the debate (Habermas 
1989). The descriptive representativeness of political institutions decreases the possibility that some 
interests or issues are overlooked (Paolino 1995; Mansbridge 1999). In effect, empirical research has 
shown that different groups put different issues on the parliamentary agenda supporting the idea that 
descriptive representation fosters substantive representation (Erzeel 2012; Mansbridge 1999; Schwindt-
Bayer 2006). In addition, inclusive legislatures are also of symbolic importance as they foster the belief 
that the political process is open to all groups in society. In effect, the presence of female role models 
fosters the belief of women in their ability to run and increases their political engagement (Alexander 
2012; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; but see Studlar and McAllister 2002).  
However, contemporary societies rarely live up to this ideal. Gender inequality is even, as 
Kenworthy and Malami (1999, 235) note, perhaps most pronounced within the political arena. Female 
presidents and prime ministers remain rare; Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes (2007) counted word-wide 
only 30 women who were elected to this top position in their country. The percentage of women in 
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legislatures too is disproportionally low in regard to the share of women in the population. At the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century, less than 30 percent of the legislature consisted of women in the overall 
majority of the countries leading to a worldwide average of 10 percent of women in legislatures 
(Kenworthy and Malami 1999, 235-236). In recent years, this pattern has not changed all that much 
(Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007).  
Several studies showed that the political representation of women is strongly influenced by the 
electoral system (Norris 1996; Matland and Montgomery 2003). In general, a system of proportional 
representation is found to be more favorable for gender equality in legislatures than a majority system 
(e.g. Norris 1996; Matland and Montgomery 2003; Leijenaar 2004). In addition to institutional 
arrangements, the ways in which actors, such as voters and parties, use the institutional provisions of 
the electoral system influences gender equality in legislatures (Tremblay 2008). Studying voting 
behavior can further our understanding of the underrepresentation of women in representative 
assemblies. To date, the results of empirical studies on the effect of voting behavior on the election of 
women to representative assemblies are mixed. Some studies provide evidence that female candidates 
obtain fewer votes than their male counterparts, while other studies find women to obtain more votes 
(Smith and Fox 2001; Leijenaar 2004; Sanbonmatsu 2002). As a result, Ballmer-Cao and Tremblay 
(2008) even stated that a system of preferential voting renders the outcome of the elections in terms of 
representation of women only more unpredictable.  
 
FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTING FOR WOMEN 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants of voting for female and male 
candidates. We begin the investigation by describing the voter and context characteristics that were 
found to influence voting for female or male candidates in previous research. A first important 
determinant is the sex of the voter. Women are theorized to be more likely to vote for women 
candidates. There are several causal mechanisms that underlie this claim. First, Dolan (2008) theorizes 
that women are more likely to vote for female than male candidates because of a “gender affinity 
effect”. Gender identity can indeed be considered as an important voting motive (Banducci and Karp 
2000). It is argued that a vote is cast based on solidarity to candidates of one’s own group rather than 
partisan affiliation, ideological stances or an evaluation of the capacities of the candidate. A condition 
for such a group identity vote is the clear delineation of the group in society (objective membership) and 
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its correspondence to a subjective identification translated in a form of group solidarity and 
consciousness (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980).  
A second reason why women vote for female candidates is that the sex of a candidate can be 
considered as an important voting cue. Politics and elections are complex to many citizens. In order to 
make a deliberate choice at the polls, citizens often have to rely on voting cues, especially in elections 
with limited information. The most used cue is party affiliation (Plutzer and Zipp 1996). By running for a 
particular party, the candidate communicates where he or she stands for to the voter. A voter expects 
for instance that a candidate of a social-democratic party will advocate the maintenance and further 
development of social services. By making this kind of generalizations, it becomes easier and less time-
consuming for voters to make an electoral choice. Associative cues can also be used by voters i.e. 
based on the group candidates belong to voters can make inferences about candidates (Cutler 2002; 
McDermott 1997, 2009). A possible inference could be that female candidates will defend women’s 
interests. The presence of female representatives is indeed found to be crucial in order to ensure that 
gender-salient issues are not overlooked (Erzeel 2012). Yet we should note that defining and 
measuring women’s interests is challenging. There is an ongoing debate within the literature about what 
these interests include (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007).  
Sanbonmatsu (2002) discusses a third reason why the sex of a candidate can have an impact 
on the decision of voters. She argues that voters have a “gender baseline preference” that is based 
upon the gender stereotypes they have. The reasoning is that stereotypes that consider women as less 
suited for political careers lead to fewer votes for female candidates and as a result fewer elected 
female politicians. This implies that an associative cue can also be used in a negative sense: voters 
refrain from voting for female candidates because they think that women in general are not as capable 
for a political function as their male counterparts.  
Empirical studies resulted in mixed evidence on the occurrence of women voting more for 
women candidates. In the US several studies indeed documented that women are more likely to vote 
for female candidates than male candidates (Paolino 1995; Brians 2005; Dolan 1998, 2008; Plutzer and 
Zipp 1996). Women were even found to be willing to shift political party in order to vote for a female 
candidate (Cook 1994). In Belgium, previous research on the national elections found an effect of sex 
and education with higher-educated women being more likely to vote for women (Carton 1998). 
However, in other studies women were not more likely to vote on female candidates (McDermott 2009; 
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King and Matland 2003). Especially, outside the context of the US, evidence of a gender affinity effect is 
rather limited to date (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011; Holli and Wass 2010; McElroy and Marsh 
2010, 2011).  
Hypothesis 1: We expect women to vote more for female candidates than for male candidates. 
The use of associative cues is particularly relevant for voters that are not very politically 
sophisticated and accordingly lack the cognitive skills or motivation to become politically informed. 
Based on the reasoning behind associative cues, it could be expected that less politically sophisticated 
voters are more likely to vote for candidates of the same sex. Therefore, choosing women candidates 
can be expected to be a function of political sophistication.  
Hypothesis 2: Women with a lower level of political sophistication are more likely to cast a vote for 
women candidates (same-sex vote). 
In addition, it is argued that voters supporting left-wing parties are more likely to vote on female 
candidates than voters supporting right-wing parties (Dolan 2008; Matland 1994). On the one hand, we 
can argue that left ideologies emphasize egalitarian values and support for subordinated groups and 
thereby increase the odds of voters with a left-wing orientation to support female candidates. On the 
other hand, political parties that are situated at the left of the ideological spectrum - such as social-
democratic and green parties - are generally more in support of egalitarian ideologies and put equality 
issues on the political agenda more often. This openness can be translated in recruiting more women, 
giving them better positions on the list and giving them more support in the election campaign (Matland 
and Studlar 1996). In effect, in majority systems political parties at the left of the ideological spectrum 
are more likely to select a female candidate than right-wing parties. However, in PR systems too the 
supply of female candidates is often unequally distributed among political parties (Dolan 2008; McElroy 
and Marsh 2010). Hence, it might be that voters with a left-wing orientation are not more likely to vote 
for female candidates but that their preferred left-wing party just happens to have more female 
candidates at elections (Dolan 2008).  This “party/sex overlap” that exists in several countries makes it 
difficult to assess whether left-wing voters are more likely to vote for female candidates or whether their 
preferred party just has more female candidates. Given the Belgian quota regulation, all political parties 
have an equal supply of candidates from both sexes. Consequently, the “party/sex overlap” is less 
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salient in Belgium. Therefore, we are better able to investigate whether the ideology of the respondent 
influences the likelihood to vote for female candidates. 
Hypothesis 3: We expect voters with a left-wing orientation to be more likely to vote on female 
candidates than voters with a right-wing orientation. 
Recently, it has been argued that voting for women is not (so much) driven by individual 
variables (voter bias), but by the context in which elections are held (Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 
2010; Giger et al. forthcoming). Although important, individual-level variables can only explain a part of 
the story. Therefore, context-related factors should be included in the analysis. In the literature three 
different contexts are considered relevant for voting for women: the political system, the electoral district 
and the political party. As in this single-country study the political system (including electoral system, 
quota regulations, attitudes toward women in society, etc.) remains constant, we will focus on the 
electoral district and the political party. 
The characteristics of the district in which the elections are held are considered to be of crucial 
importance for voting for women (Giger et al. forthcoming). Given that elections in small districts tend 
to be more competitive, political parties more often select candidates with a broad appeal and voters 
tend to vote only for candidates who have a real chance to become elected. As a result, women are 
likely to encounter more difficulties in small districts (especially when voters are only allowed to cast a 
single vote). This phenomenon is apparent in majority systems, but also in PR systems with small 
district magnitude. Related, women are less likely to be selected in highly competitive elections (i.e. the 
closeness of the contest) (Giger et al. forthcoming).  
Another important context variable is the ratio of male and female candidates running (McElroy 
and Marsh 2010). The supply of female candidates is important: the more (valuable) female 
candidates, the higher the chance to cast a vote for a woman (McElroy and Marsh 2010). In general, 
female candidates are underrepresented at the ballot. Moreover, not only the ratio of male and female 
candidates is important, also the position of a candidate on the list affects the number of votes he/she 
attracts. In effect, the first candidate on the ballot list is the most visible candidate position, which due to 
the ballot layout effect (Geys and Heyndels 2003; Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010; Lutz 2010) 
quite automatically obtains a higher number of preference votes (Marissal and Hansen 2001). Political 
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parties play a crucial role as they determine the rank order of the list. In practice, women are seldom 
given this top position of the list (Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010).  
Before formulating hypotheses on the influence of the context on voting for female candidates, 
we describe the characteristics of the Belgian local election context more in depth given that these 
characteristics have an impact on these hypotheses.  
 
BELGIUM AS AN INTERESTING CASE  
Participation in elections is compulsory at all levels of governance in Belgium, which resulted in 
the 2012 municipal elections in a turnout rate of 89,7%. At all levels of electoral competition a PR 
system with rather large districts and flexible lists is used in Belgium: voters can either vote for a party 
list or for one or more candidates (on a single party list). Candidates receiving sufficient preference 
votes to pass the election threshold are automatically elected. The other candidates can make use of 
the list votes in order to reach the threshold. These list votes are distributed to candidates according to 
their order on the list offering a substantial advantage to candidates at the top of the list. Consequently, 
the system used to function as a de facto closed-list system. This changed recently as a result of an 
increasing number of preference votes at the expense of list votes as well as an electoral reform that 
decreased the impact of list votes on the allocation of seats to candidates (by dividing the number of list 
votes by three before distributing them) (André, Wauters, and Pilet 2012). As a result, more low ranked 
candidates have managed to get elected at the expense of higher ranked candidates. Consequently, at 
present the Belgian electoral system can be characterized as a de facto semi-open-list PR system. In 
practice, the local electoral system has been more open compared to the other levels as more voters 
cast preference votes and more candidates are elected in defiance of the party’s ranking at the local 
level. For instance, even before the electoral reform more than two thirds of the local councilors were 
elected without using any list votes (Wauters, 2000). 
Within the elections in Belgium voters do not necessarily have to make a choice between voting 
for male or female candidates: they can vote for both (mixed-gender voter) or for the party list as a 
whole (list voter). Moreover, a vote for a male candidate does not preclude a vote for a female 
candidate, or in other words voting for women is not at the expense of voting for men. We expect this 
particular element to break down the barriers to vote for female candidates. In the literature, it is argued 
that in small districts or in highly competitive electoral contests voters are likely to cast a strategic vote 
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for men in order to increase the chances of gaining a seat for their preferred party rather than for the 
person of their preferred sex (Giger et al. forthcoming). Given that voting for male and female 
candidates can easily be combined in Belgium, we do not expect that district magnitude has an effect 
on voting for female candidates. In line with this expectation, a study of the Belgian local elections in 
2000 described the correlation between district magnitude and preference votes for women to be weak 
(Marissal and Hansen 2001). 
Hypothesis 4: District magnitude has no effect on the likelihood to vote for female candidates. 
The long-existing and far-reaching quota system is another element that makes Belgium an 
interesting case to analyze. Legislation aimed at increasing the proportion of women on candidate lists 
was introduced rather early in Belgium (Meier 2004; Celis and Meier 2006). In 1994, a first quota law 
was introduced at the national level stating that maximum two thirds of the candidates on a list could be 
of the same sex. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement that electoral lists should contain an 
equal number of male and female candidates (or differing by one in the case of an odd number of 
candidates). In addition, one of the two highest (often safe, eligible) positions on the list should be 
reserved for a female candidate. In 2005, a similar quota regulation was adopted at the municipal level 
and - after some transitional measures - the regulation is applied in full force in the 2012 local elections.  
As a result, the presence of women on the list cannot influence the propensity to cast a vote for 
women. This does not mean, however, that the composition of the list does not matter. The number of 
women at the first position of the list is not guaranteed and research has shown that this top position is 
mostly granted to a man (Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010). At all levels of electoral competition 
this candidate has the largest chance of being elected because he/she is the first in line to use the list 
votes to reach the threshold. The position itself increases the number of preference votes too because 
of the ballot layout, the amount of media-exposure, the amount of campaign funding received from the 
political party as well as the party finance regulations that allow this candidate to spend more money on 
his/her campaign than other lower-ranked candidates (Wauters, et al. 2010). The first candidates are 
most likely to obtain the most important exective functions e.g. it is a standard practice that the first 
candidate of the largest political party becomes the mayor of the municipality. Hence it is important that 
women also obtain this key position. Given that this top position almost automatically guarantees a 
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large number of preference votes, we expect the likelihood to vote for a female candidate to be larger 
when more women occupy the top position of the list in the electoral district. 
Hypothesis 5: The likelihood to vote for a female candidate is larger in electoral districts with a higher 
percentage of lists that have a woman at the top of the list. 
In sum, the PR system and quota regulations are implemented at all levels of electoral 
competition and these are also the core of this study. The institutional provision of multiple preference 
votes allows us to gain an insight into how the use of voters of such provisions affects gender equality 
in legislative office. The quota regulations enable us to distinguish better between the ideology of the 
voter and the supply of women by the political party in the voters’ choice to vote for women. Given that 
these two characteristics are similar at the local and national level, we would expect similar results at 
the national level. Moreover, as a result of increased professionalization, national political parties take 
part in the elections in the overall majority of the municipalities (Wayenberg et al. 2010). Therefore, the 
electoral context is similar at the local and national level.  
Yet the local elections also have unique characteristics that make it an interesting case to 
study. It has been argued that women face more difficulties to become elected when the perceived 
importance of political office is higher (‘law of minority attrition’) (Borisyuk, Rallings, Thrasher 2007). In 
this regard, local elections could offer a more favorable environment for the election of women 
(Borisyuk, Rallings, Thrasher 2007). The stakes at local elections can be considered lower as the local 
level of governance has only limited authority compared to the competences situated at the regional or 
national level (Deschouwer 2009). Therefore, local elections have been labelled second order elections 
(Heath et al 1999). However, in Belgium the local level and elections are considered important and 
cannot be categorized as ‘second-order’. In effect, voters use local voting motives and give similar 
importance scores to the local and national level (Lefevere 2013). The closeness and visibility of the 
municipal level increases the importance of this level - with municipal competences such as town 
planning and the maintenance of road infrastructure or public order affecting everyday life of its 
residents. Therefore, we do not expect the difference in competences will strongly influence the 
likelihood to vote for women.  
Descriptive figures on the representativeness of legislatures and voting behavior corroborate 
this reasoning. The representativeness of men and women in the local and national legislatures are of a 
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similar magnitude with 36% female elected representatives in the 2012 municipal election compared to 
39% at the 2010 national elections (See: http://www.ipu.org). In addition, the number of voters casting a 
preference vote for at least one woman is similar at different levels of governance in Belgium with 
approximately 54% of the voters casting at least one preference vote for a woman at the municipal 
elections compared to approximately 55% of the voters at the regional elections (2012 Exit Poll data; 
Caluwaert, Erzeel & Meier, 2013). Hence, there is no clear evidence that local elections would be a 
substantially better or worse context to gain office for women. 
Yet we might theorize that the likelihood of same-sex voting differs between the local and 
national elections. The closeness of the local level to everyday life and the local candidates make the 
local elections a higher information context than the national elections. In effect, at the local level more 
preference votes are cast than at other levels of governance in Belgium (Wauters, et al. 2012). 
Moreover, within the 2012 local elections the majority of the voters indicated that they voted for a 
candidate they personally knew. This high-information context might decrease the use of same-sex 
voting as a voting cue. The context of personal contacts might also influence the electoral chances of 
women. Therefore, it is important to investigate same-sex voting in the local elections and to gain an 
insight in the effect of knowing a candidate personally on voting behavior.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Several Belgian universities (KU Leuven, ULB, UAntwerpen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
UHasselt, UGent) collaborated in the organization of an exit poll in the context of the municipal elections 
in Belgium that resulted in the 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll dataset. Face-to face interviews were followed 
by a self-administered mock-ballot on which respondents were asked to cast their (preference) votes 
again. This innovative method of surveying vote choices was previously also employed in the Irish 
National Election Studies (Marsh and Sinnott 2008; McElroy and Marsh 2010). This methodology is a 
particularly useful tool to record voting behavior including detailed information on preferential voting in 
an open list electoral system with a high number of preference votes. By means of these mock-ballots 
we gathered information on party choice and preference votes of the respondents. Moreover, these 
responses are not biased by media reports on the election outcome or by gaps in the memory of the 
respondents.  
A multi-stage stratified sampling procedure was used. First, a random sample of municipalities 
was drawn based on region and on socio-economic indicators of the municipalities
1
. Subsequently, a 
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random sample of polling stations within the 40 selected municipalities was drawn. The number of 
polling stations in each municipality was determined by the number of inhabitants, while ensuring that 
all municipalities were covered by at least one team of interviewers. Interview teams (consisting of two 
students of the participating institutions who had received intensive training) were allotted to each 
polling station. In order to randomize the selection of respondents, interviewers were instructed to 
approach every fifth voter leaving the polling station and ask him/her to participate. The total response 
rate was 37.9 percent and 84.4 percent of these respondents also indicated their voting behavior on the 
mock-ballot (N= 3,846). Within this sample, 973 voters indicated they casted a list vote. As the main 
interest of this study is on those respondents that have cast one or more preference votes, the 
respondents that have cast a list vote are not investigated.
2
 As a result, the sample used in the 
analyses includes 2,873 respondents. In order to correct for small biases in the representativeness of 
the dataset, we weigh the respondents according to age groups, sex and region. 
 
Dependent variable 
Voters can use their preference votes in various ways in the Belgian flexible list system. They 
can choose to cast none, one or multiple preference votes on candidates of one or both sex(es) within 
one party list. Given that the first position on the list is a highly visible position, it is also interesting to 
distinguish between casting one preference vote on the first candidate of the list and casting a 
preference vote for another candidate lower down the list. These options of preference voting result in a 
dependent variable with seven categories: voting for only women including the options: (1) casting one 
preference vote on the first candidate on the list (2) voting for one woman - not the first candidate on the 
list, (3) voting for multiple women; and voting for only men including the options: (4) casting one 
preference vote on the first candidate on the list, (5) voting for one man, not the first candidate on the 
list, (6) voting for multiple men and (7) voting on both men and women. This will allow us to sketch a 




A first independent variable we include in the analysis is the sex of the respondent. In line with 
hypothesis 1, we expect women to be more likely to vote for women than men (Dolan 1998). Next, 
political sophistication is expected to affect voting for women (Hypothesis 2). In the literature political 
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sophistication generally has two components: a cognitive component and a motivational component 
(Luskin 1990). We operationalize the cognitive component of political sophistication as the highest level 
of education a respondent completed. This variable includes three categories namely lower education 
(i.e. completed primary education or lower secondary), middle education (i.e. completed higher 
secondary education) and higher education (i.e. completed tertiary education). We operationalize the 
motivation to get politically informed by including political interest in the local level in the analysis. This 
variable was measured on a scale from 0 (“no interest at all”) to 10 (“a lot of interest”). In line with 
hypothesis 3, we include the ideology of the respondent measured on an eleven-point scale with a 
value of 0 indicating a left-wing ideology and a value of 10 indicating a right-wing ideology.  
At the voter level, we also include a number of control variables. Firstly, we include the age of 
the respondent in line with previous research (McElroy and Marsh 2010; Holli and Wass 2010). The 
results of previous studies are mixed documenting younger people to be more likely to vote for 
candidates of their own sex or finding no effect of age on gender-based voting behavior (McElroy and 
Marsh 2010; Holli and Wass 2010). We also control for the region in which the respondent lives 
(Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels). This is a general control variable, controlling for differences between 
Belgian regions in degree of urbanization, particular electoral rules and party system. It is also likely that 
casting a preference vote is influenced by whether one knows a candidate on the list personally, 
especially in municipal elections. Respondents were asked whether it was important that they knew a 
candidate personally in the decision to cast their preference vote(s) on an eleven-point scale with a 
value of 0 indicating this was not important at all and a value of 10 indicating this was very important. 
At the context-level, we include district magnitude in line with hypothesis 4. Given the PR 
system with rather large districts, and the possibility to vote for more than one candidate of the same 
list, we do not expect an effect of district magnitude on voting for female candidates. Finally, in line with 
hypothesis 5, we include the percentage of lists in the electoral district that have a woman on the first 
place.  
We conducted a multinomial multilevel logistic regression given that the dependent variable 
consists of seven categories that are nominal. Multilevel regression techniques are required given the 
hierarchical structure of the data (individuals nested in the electoral district) and the inclusion of 
individual and electoral district level variables (Hox 2010).  
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RESULTS 
First, we describe the frequency of voting for female and male candidates in the 2012 municipal 
elections in Belgium. We investigate whether there is a difference in the frequency of voting for male 
and female candidates and whether this can be explained by the characteristics of the voter (i.e. sex, 
political sophistication, ideological orientation). Next, we investigate the effect of the party on gender 
equality by investigating the amount of women taking the first place on the list. Subsequently, we 
present the results of a multilevel multinomial regression in which we try to explain voting for male and 
female candidates taking into account individual as well as context variables. 
 
Descriptive results 
In the subsequent analyses, we focus on the respondents that voted for one or more 
candidates and analyze the distribution in preference votes for male and female candidates. The results 
of this analysis show that fewer respondents voted for female candidates than male candidates (Table 
1). While 79.2 percent of the respondents voted for at least one male candidate, only 53.8 percent of 
the respondents voted for at least one female candidate. Despite the equal supply of male and female 
candidates resulting from the strict quota regulation, female candidates receive less preference votes 
than their male counterparts. There is no significant difference between female and male voters in the 
frequency of voting for female candidates. However, male voters vote significantly more for male 
candidates than female voters. 81.7 percent of the male respondents voted for at least one male 
candidate compared to 76.8 percent of the female respondents. We can conclude that same-sex voting 
is more common among male voters than among female voters contrary to the emphasis in the theory 
on women supporting women at elections. This finding is not unique to the Belgian case as previous 
research on the Finnish elections led to the same conclusion (Holli and Wass 2010). It adds to the 
empirical evidence that calls attention to same-sex voting not in terms of a gender affinity effect for 
women but in terms of men supporting men at elections reinforcing their overrepresentation in 
legislatures. 
Voting for “at least one female candidate” is a broad category that can include voting for one 
female candidate, multiple female candidates or female and male candidates. The results in Table 1 
allow us to disentangle between these various options: one third of the respondents voted for both male 
and female candidates (“mixed vote”) whereas two third of the respondents only voted for candidates of 
one sex. We can observe that it is much more common to vote for only male candidates than to vote for 
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only female candidates. In effect, almost half of the respondents voted only for male candidates, while 
only one fifth of the respondents casted its preference votes only on female candidates. Voters can 
choose how many preference votes they cast (within one list) and the results show that many voters 
cast only one preference vote. Approximately 20 percent of the respondents voted on one female 
candidate, whereas approximately 40 percent of the respondents voted on one male candidate (i.e. half 
of them on the first candidate on the list, half on another candidate on the list). Only 3.2 percent of the 
respondents casted multiple preference votes on female voters, whereas 8.6 percent of the 
respondents casted multiple preference votes exclusively on male candidates. There are significant 
differences between men and women in their voting behavior. Women are more likely to cast multiple 
preference votes on women candidates, while the amount of men engaging in this behavior is below 
average (contributing most to the chi
2
 value i.e. respectively 24.1% and 22.6%). Likewise, male voters 
are more likely than female voters to cast multiple preference votes only on men (contributing 12.5% to 
the chi
2
 value). There appears to be a gender effect, but only for voters casting more than one vote. 
If we turn to the figures on “same-sex voting” (i.e. women voting for women; men voting for 
men), “cross-sex voting” (i.e. women voting for men; men voting for women) and “mixed-voting” (i.e. 
voting on male and female candidates), we see that the distribution of the different voting types in the 
total sample is relatively equal. There are some interesting differences between male and female 
candidates with male respondents voting significant more for candidates of the same sex and female 
respondents voting significantly more for candidates of a different sex. We can conclude that same-sex 
voting is more common among male voters than among female voters despite the emphasis in the 
literature on female voters supporting women. Despite the equal supply of male and female candidates, 
male as well as female respondents cast more often one or more preference votes on male than on 
female candidates.  
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Next to the sex of the voter, we also expect a relation between political sophistication and 
same-sex voting. We present the relation between voting behavior and education (Table 2) and political 
interest in the local level (Table 3). The results in Table 2 show that higher educated respondents are 
less likely to cast a vote on a candidate of the same-sex and more likely to cast a mixed vote. This is in 
line with hypothesis 2 that states respondents with lower levels of political sophistication are more likely 
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to cast a same-sex vote. The number of respondents with higher education that casts a mixed vote is 
higher than expected if all groups had been equally likely to cast a mixed-vote (contributing about 24% 
to the chi
2
 value). The number of respondents with secondary education casting a mixed vote is less 
than expected if all groups had been equally likely to cast a mixed-vote (contributing about 23% to the 
chi
2
 value). We do not have specific expectations regarding the relation between political sophistication 
and voting for women in general. The results show that higher educated respondents are less likely to 
vote on only male candidates than respondents with secondary education (contributing approximately 
10.5% to the chi
2
 value).  
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Turning to political interest, the results in Table 3 also show in line with expectations that voters 
with lower levels of political interest more frequently vote on candidates of the same sex. Respondents 
with a higher level of political interest vote more often on both male and female candidates (mixed vote) 
than respondents with lower levels of political interest. In effect, respondents that voted for candidates 
of both sexes have a mean value of 6.86 on the 0-10 point political interest scale, whereas respondent 
that voted on only women have a mean value of 5.48 and respondents that voted only on male 
candidates have a mean value of 5.66. Political interest in the local level relates to the number of 
preference votes too. Respondents that voted on multiple candidates (mixed or only one sex) have 
higher levels of political interest than respondents that voted on only one candidate. Nevertheless, the 
highest level of political interest is found among respondents that voted on both female and male 
candidates (mixed vote). 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
Turning to the ideological orientation of the voter, the results in Table 4 show no significant 
difference between the ideological orientation of the respondents and the likelihood to vote on women. 
Against our expectation, left-wing voters do not seem to be more inclined to vote on female candidates 
than right-wing voters. 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Turning to the context-level, we find that the gender distribution of the list is indeed biased with 
25% of the first candidates in the sample being women. This is in line with the official statistics in 
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Flanders that show that 20% of the first candidates were women. The quota regulations lead to an 
equal representation of women on the list and within the top two positions. Yet political parties 
predominantly implement the quota regulations by giving the first position to a male candidate and the 
second position to a female candidate. The results in Table 5 clearly show that women do not have the 
same chances to become elected than men. Additional analyses show that there are no substantial 
differences between left-wing and right-wing parties. Men - even within left-wing parties - predominantly 
take up the first key position of the list. 
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
Multilevel analysis 
After investigating the bivariate relations for the individual variables, we turn to a multivariate 
analysis in which we include both individual variables and context variables (at the level of the electoral 
district). In Table 6 the results of the multinomial multilevel regression analyses are presented. The 
intra-class correlation of the baseline empty model is approximately 4 percent. Hence, most variation in 
voting for male and female candidates is situated at the individual level, and not at the level of the 
electoral districts. Therefore, the context variables can only offer a limited explanation for the individual 
differences documented in voting for female candidates. By including the independent variables our 
ability to predict voting behavior accurately improves as the log likelihood value decreases significantly 
compared to the empty baseline model. Moreover, we are able to explain a large part of the variance 
between the electoral districts as the intra-class correlation drops to 0.05 percent. 
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
In line with the bivariate results, we see that women are more likely to cast multiple preference 
votes on female candidates but less likely to cast multiple preference votes on male candidates. 
Further, political sophistication (both the cognitive and the motivational component) influences voting for 
female candidates. Respondents with tertiary education are less likely to vote only for male candidates 
than respondents with higher secondary education. Higher educated respondents are more likely to 
vote on female and male candidates than on only male candidates. In addition, respondents with 
tertiary education are also less likely to vote only for the first (male or female) candidate on the list 
compared to respondents with higher secondary education. In line with the bivariate results, we see that 
respondents with high levels of political interest are more likely to vote on both male and female 
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candidates than to vote on candidates of one sex. Only voting on multiple women does not significantly 
differ from mixed voting.  
To test whether women with lower levels of political sophistication vote more on women 
candidates (same-sex voting), we ran additional models taking same-sex voting as the dependent 
variable. These results too confirm the hypothesis that respondents with lower levels of political interest 
are more likely to vote on candidates of the same-sex even within this high-information context of the 
local elections. There is no difference between male and female voters: both sexes vote on candidates 
of the same sex when they have a lower level of political interest (See appendix for results of the 
additional tests). 
To test hypothesis 3, we added the ideological orientation of the respondents to the analysis. 
As indicated above, as a result of the quota regulation party differences in the number of female 
candidates are non-existent. Therefore, we are better able than previous studies to investigate the 
effect of the ideological orientations of voters on the likelihood to vote for women keeping the supply of 
female candidates by left-wing and right-wing parties constant. The results show that respondents with 
a right-wing ideology are more likely to vote on the man who is the first candidate on the list than to vote 
for male and female candidates, yet there is no significant relation between ideology and other possible 
voting choices. We can conclude that the ideological orientation of individual voters does not impact 
(largely) on the likelihood to vote for women. In general, left-wing voters are against expectations not 
more likely to vote on women than right-wing voters.
3
 Further, we see that respondents that indicate 
that knowing a candidate personally is an important voting motive are less likely to vote only on the first 
candidate on the list. In addition, they are less likely to vote only on women while there is no effect of 
knowing a candidate personally on voting only on men.  
At the electoral district level, we find that district magnitude has no uniform effect on voting for 
female candidates. In electoral districts with a larger district magnitude respondents are more likely to 
vote on one female candidate than to cast a mixed vote. Yet respondents are also more likely to vote on 
one male candidate (the first or another man on the list) than to cast a mixed vote. We can conclude 
that district magnitude rather affects the number of preference votes than the sex of the preferred 
candidate(s). This latter element is at odds with earlier findings in Finland (Giger et al. forthcoming), but 
for logical reasons: the possibility in Belgium to cast multiple preference votes lowers competitiveness 
which is considered the driving force behind the district magnitude effect on gender-based voting. 
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Finally, the more women hold the first place of the list in an electoral district, the more likely 
voters will be to vote on a woman at the top of the list and the less likely they are to vote on a man at 
the top of the list. Even in quota systems, the supply of candidates proves to be important: not so much 
the number, but the position of women on the list matters. A larger supply of female candidates on the 
first position of the list does, however, not increase the likelihood of voting for multiple women nor does 
it decrease the likelihood of voting for only men. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 The underrepresentation of women in representative assemblies is increasingly considered as 
a problem in contemporary societies because of normative, substantive, symbolic and efficiency 
reasons. The presence of women in representative assemblies is strongly influenced by the electoral 
system with proportional representation systems being more beneficial to the election of women than 
majority systems. However, the gender equality of the outcomes of various proportional systems also 
differs. A crucial factor in the analyses of the underrepresentation of women in legislatures is the study 
of voting behavior. Studying the provisions for preferential voting and how voters can (and effectively) 
use these provisions furthers our understanding of the descriptive representation of women.  
 We focused in this study on characteristics of the voter and the context that facilitate or hinder 
preference votes for female candidates. We rely on the results of a large-scale exit poll survey in which 
face-to-face interviews were combined with mock ballots. This innovative methodology is particularly 
useful to gain a better insight in the nature of preference votes in a flexible list system. As voters can 
cast multiple preference votes within one party list in Belgium, the use of a mock ballot during an exit 
poll allows to collect extensive information on preference votes that is unbiased by gaps in the memory 
of the respondents and media reports on the election outcome.  
 We find that a strong disparity in voting for female and male candidates: about one out of two 
respondents voted for at least one female candidate, whereas about eight out of ten respondents voted 
for at least one male candidate. We expected female voters to be more likely than male voters to vote 
for female candidates, yet same-sex voting appeared to be more common among male voters than 
female voters. This is in line with a recent study on the Finnish national elections (Holli and Wass 2010) 
indicating that despite the strong focus in the literature on women supporting women, men support men 
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more in elections. Nevertheless, women voters are still more likely than men to cast preference votes 
exclusively for several female candidates. 
Given that the local level is a very visible policy level close to the citizen, we expected the use 
of voting cues such as the sex of the candidate to be less relevant in this context. However, the results 
show that same-sex voting is more common among voters with lower levels of political sophistication. 
Women with lower levels of political interest were more likely to vote on women candidates while men 
with lower levels of political interest were also more likely to cast a vote on male candidate. Further, 
higher educated voters are compared to lower educated respondents more likely to vote on both male 
and female candidates than on male candidates only. Respondents with higher levels of political 
interest are also more likely to cast this type of mixed vote than respondents with lower levels of political 
interest. Hence, the most sophisticated behavior seems not to limit oneself to candidates of one sex but 
to vote for multiple candidates of both sexes.  
Further, this study of the Belgian case enabled us to disentangle better between the ideology of 
the voter and the supply of female candidates. The quota regulations obligate all political parties to have 
an equal number of male and female candidates making the party/sex overlap less problematic in 
Belgium. We find no evidence that ideology of individual voters is strongly related to voting for female 
candidates. Hence, the effect of ideology on voting for women might be result of the unequal supply by 
parties (with left-wing parties presenting more female candidates) rather than the choice of left-wing 
voters to support female candidates more than voters with a right-wing orientation.  
Personal contacts also affected voting behavior as it proved to be able to foster support to 
candidates on less prominent positions on the list and increase the number of preference votes a voter 
casts. Yet the results seem to suggest that these personal contacts mainly relate to male candidates as 
knowing a candidate personally increases the likelihood of casting a mixed rather than an ‘all female 
ballot’ but not than an ‘all male ticket’. We have no information on the sex of these personally known 
candidates so this reasoning cannot be tested. Yet it is clear that the local context in which candidates 
are well known and in which these contacts serve as an important voting motive does not increase 
gender equality in legislatures. 
Not only individual factors are expected to influence voting for women, also the context is likely 
to affect the likelihood to vote for women (Giger et al. forthcoming). As expected district magnitude has 
a limited effect on the likelihood of voting for a female candidate in Belgium given that intra-party 
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competition tends to be low as voters can cast multiple preference votes. Rather than the sex of the 
preferred candidate(s), district magnitude mainly affects the number of candidates one supports. 
Finally, the supply of female candidates plays an important role even in Belgium where the number of 
female candidates has to equal that of male candidates. Unlike previous research, not the number of 
female candidates is important (McElroy and Marsh 2010) but their position on the ballot list has an 
effect on the propensity to vote for a woman. We find that when more women take the first place, voters 
are more likely to vote on the woman that holds this first position and less likely to vote on a man that 
holds this position. Yet, there is no spill-over effect: the likelihood of voting for only men does not 
decrease nor does the likelihood of a mixed vote or a vote for multiple women increase in electoral 
districts with more women holding the first position of the list. Moreover, when looking at the lists there 
is no clear difference between left-wing and right-wing parties: all parties predominantly put male 
candidates on top of their lists. We can conclude that ideological orientation might influence gender 
equality on numerous aspects (e.g. proposing equality policies and quota regulations etc.), it does not 
seem to be of a large importance for the election of women in Belgian’s PR flexible list system. 
We can conclude that preferential voting can affect the descriptive representation of women 
substantially. By supporting female candidates voters can further more gender equality in election 
outcomes. Moreover, the results of this study show that 55 percent of all preference voters cast only a 
vote for one candidate and 24 percent of all preference voters cast only a vote for the candidate at the 
top of the list. Hence, voters can use the ability to cast preference votes even more to influence the 
election of female candidates. Further, political parties are also able to influence the election of women: 
by granting women (more and) better positions on the ballot list, including the top position, they can 
incite more voters to cast a vote on a female candidate. Though we found only limited differences 
between voting for female candidates in the different electoral districts, this does not mean that context 
factors are not important. Rather the similarities between the different electoral districts are the likely 
result of the similarities between political parties in granting only few women the top position on the list. 
While Belgium has strict quota regulations, this does not prevent the top of list to remain male 
dominated. It is exactly this position that is crucial for obtaining a large number of preference votes and 
gaining a seat in representative assemblies and the executives. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 The Dexia or Belfius typology was used to this end, which classifies the 598 municipalities in Belgium 
in homogenous socio-economic clusters See: 
https://www.belfius.be/publicsocial/NL/Expertise/Studies/Themas/SociaalEconomischeTypologie/ind
ex.aspx?firstWA=no [in Dutch]). 
2
 Three quarters of the respondents casted one or more preference votes whereas one quarter casted a 
list vote (with no significant difference between male and female voters). When including list voters 
in the analysis, the results confirm previous studies with voters with lower levels of political interest 
and voters living in larger electoral districts being more likely to cast a list vote (André, et al, 2012). 
3
 It was also tested whether there is an interaction between ideology and sex in predicting same-sex 




Table 1: Frequency of voting for female and male candidates 
 Total Male voters Female voters 
Voted for at least 1 women     ns 
(Chi
2
df=1 = 3.28) 
53.82 52.01 55.49 
Voted for at least 1 men          ** 
(Chi
2
df=1 = 10.44) 
79.15 81.72 76.77 
Only women 20.85   
  1
st
 candidate: woman 5.11 4.70 5.43 
  1 candidate: woman (not 1
st
) 12.57 11.54 13.54 
  Only women (>1) 3.17 2.06 4.19 
Only men 45.97   
  1
st
 candidate: man 18.96 18.81 19.11 
  1 candidate: man (not 1
st
) 18.39 18.96 17.87 
  Only men (>1) 8.62 9.92 7.42 
Mixed 33.18 34.02 32.44 
Total (Chi
2
df=6= 19.21**) 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Same-sex 35.04 47.59 23.21 
Cross-sex 31.77 18.30 44.37 
Mixed-sex 33.18 34.02 32.44 
Total (Chi
2
df=3 = 272.92***) 100.00 100.00 100.00 




Only respondents that have cast at least one preference vote are included. Weight applied to correct for small 
differences in age, sex and region. Sign: * p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
 
Table 2. Voting for women according to education  
Percentage of respondents Lower education Middle education Higher education 
Only women    
  1
st
 candidate: woman 3.29 5.88 5.23 
  1 candidate: woman (not 1
st
) 12.20 12.93 12.34 
  Multiple women only 2.95 3.18 3.28 
Only men    
  1
st
 candidate: man 20.22 20.18 17.33 
  1 candidate: man (not 1
st
) 19.22 19.67 16.95 
  Multiple men only 9.76 9.95 6.97  
Mixed 32.38 28.21 37.90 
Total N=2,868 (Chi
2
df=12= 37.21***) 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Same-sex 32.69 40.01 31.65 
Cross-sex 34.93 31.78 30.45 
Mixed-sex 32.38 28.21 37.90 
Total N=2,865 (Chi
2
df=4 =32.35***) 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll. Notes: Cells in bold contribute most to the Chi
2
.Weight applied to correct for 
small differences in age, sex, region. 
 
 
Table 3. Voting for women according to political interest 
Voting types Mean S.D. Sig. different from… 
Only women 5.48 2.83  
  1
st
 candidate: woman 5.26 2.71 Mixed, only men 
  1 candidate: woman (not 1
st
) 5.38 2.93 Mixed, only men 
  Multiple women only 6.21 2.50  
Only men 5.66 2.91  
  1
st
 candidate: man 5.57 2.97 Mixed, only men 
  1 candidate: man (not 1
st
) 5.50 2.93 Mixed, only men 
  Multiple men only 6.21 2.67 Mixed, 1
st
 women, 1 women, 1 man 
Mixed 6.86 2.43  1
st
 women, 1 women, 1
st
 man, 1 man, only men 
Total N=2,866 (F-test statisticdf=6 = 25.61***) 6.02 2.80  
Mixed-sex 6.86 2.43 Same sex, cross-sex 
Same-sex 5.65 2.88 Mixed 
Cross-sex 5.55 2.89 Mixed 
Total N=2,863 (F-test statisticdf=2 = 66.48***)    
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll. Notes: Weight applied to correct for small differences in age, sex, region. In the last 
column the results from Bonferroni post hoc tests are presented. Categories displayed in bold: level of political interest is 
higher among those voters, categories not in bold: level of political interest is lower among these voters. 
Table(s)
  
Table 4. Voting for women according to ideological orientation 
 Mean S.D. 
Only women   
  1
st
 candidate: woman 5.02 2.24 
  1 candidate: woman (not 1
st
) 4.62 2.19 
  Multiple women only 4.91 1.93 
Only men   
  1
st
 candidate: man 4.92 2.31 
  1 candidate: man (not 1
st
) 4.87 2.14 
  Multiple men only 4.67 2.15 
Mixed 4.76 2.28 
TotalN=2,806 (F-test statisticdf=6 = 1.19) 4.83 2.20 
Mixed-sex 4.76 2.28 
Same-sex 4.90 2.23 
Cross-sex 4.75 2.17 
Total N=2,803 (F-test statisticdf=2 = 1.33)   
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll. Notes: Weight applied to correct for small differences in age, sex and region. There 
are no significant differences between the categories. 
 
 
Table 5. Gender distribution of list positions and success rates in Flanders  
Position % Male % Female % Elected 
1 79.98 20.02 83.1 
2 20.2 79.8 56.0 
3 79.1 20.9 49.0 
4 50.9 49.1 35.8 
5 62.0 38.0 28.3 
6 45.7 54.3 21.6 
7 57.0 43.0 17.2 
8 41.8 58.2 13.9 
9 54.2 45.8 11.0 
10 42.2 57.8 10.7 
>10  49.2    50.8    10.6   
Source: Official statistics 2012 local elections (307 municipalities).  Authors’ calculations 
  
 
Table 6. Multilevel multinomial regression explaining voting for women 
 Only women Only men 
 1
st
 woman 1 woman
a
 >1 women 1
st
 man 1 man
a
 > 1 men 
Individual level      
Women  0.150 
(0.202)    
 0.138 
(0.135)    
 0.777** 
(0.237)    
-0.063 
(0.125)    
-0.060 
(0.117)    
-0.309* 
(0.153)    
Education (ref: higher)      
   Lower -0.537 
(0.351)    
-0.035 
(0.199)    
-0.247 
(0.356)    
 0.175 
(0.182)    
 0.216 
(0.170)    
 0.573** 
(0.213)    
   Middle  0.428* 
(0.216)    
 0.201 
(0.150)    
 0.290 
(0.247)    
 0.481** 
(0.139)    
 0.410** 
(0.131)    
 0.640*** 
(0.171)    
Political interest -0.196*** 
(0.037)    
-0.186*** 
(0.026)    
-0.080 
(0.045)    
-0.157*** 
(0.024)    
-0.183*** 
(0.023)    
-0.082** 
(0.030)    
Age -0.009 
(0.006)    
-0.011** 
(0.004)    
 0.005 
(0.007)    
-0.005 
(0.004)    
-0.015*** 
(0.004)    
-0.011* 
(0.005)    
Region       
   Bruxelles  1.182**  
(0.344)   
 0.019 
(0.246)    
 0.855* 
(0.367)    
-0.641** 
(0.243)    
 0.216 
(0.212)    
 0.088 
(0.258)    
   Flanders  0.604* 
(0.273)    
 0.185 
(0.166)    
 0.122  
(0.285)   
 0.495** 
(0.156)    
-0.045 
(0.144)    
-0.368* 
(0.178)    
Ideology (Right)  0.058 
(0.048)    
-0.017 
(0.031)    
 0.061 
(0.053)    
 0.083** 
(0.029)    
 0.023 
(0.027)    
-0.001 




(0.029)    
-0.065** 
(0.020)    
-0.071* 
(0.033)    
-0.178*** 
(0.018)    
-0.023 
(0.018)    
-0.019 
(0.023)    
Municipal level      
% 1
st
 candidate: woman 2.956*** 
(0.785)    
-0.360 
(0.493)    
 0.852 
(0.809)    
-2.803*** 
(0.502)    
-0.058  
(0.426)   
-0.435 
(0.533)    
District magnitude -0.004 
(0.011)    
 0.021** 
(0.008)    
 0.005 
(0.013)    
 0.060*** 
(0.007)    
 0.015* 
(0.007)    
 0.002 




(0.454)    
-2.931*** 
(0.788)    
-0.660 
(0.420)    
 0.617 
(0.400)    
-0.116 
(0.509)    
Log likelihood -4,128.855      
Variance 0.015 
(0.022)        
Intra-class correlation (in 
%) 
0.045 
     
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll (n=2,581; 40 municipalities). Notes: Only respondents that have cast at least one 
preference vote are included. Results of a multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis. Reference category= 
Mixed vote. Unstandardized coefficients are presented with standard errors between brackets. Information empty 
baseline model: Log likelihood= -4,435.589. Variancebaseline= 0.138 (0.055) ICC in %=4.04. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < 
.001. 
a
 Not the first on the list. 
  
APPENDIX 
Descriptive information variables multinomial multilevel analysis 
 Min. Max. Mean SD. 
Dependent variable: Type of preference vote  1 7  4.950     1.902    
Independent variables     
Women 0 1  0.485     0.500    
Education     
  Basic or lower secondary 0 1  0.172     0.377    
  Higher secondary 0 1  0.379     0.485    
  Tertiary education (reference category) 0 1 0.449 0.497 
Age 18 92 44.484     16.767    
Region       
  Brussels 0 1  0.132     0.338    
  Flanders 0 1  0.576     0.494    
  Wallonia (reference category) 0 1   0.293   0.455     
Political interest local level 
(0=no interest at all; 10= a lot of interest) 
0 10  6.111     2.756    
Ideology (0=Left; 10=right) 0 10  4.775     2.226    
Know candidate personally 
(0= not important all; 10=very important) 
0 10  6.097     3.752    
Electoral district level     
District magnitude 15 55  35.734    10.706    
Proportion women 1
st
 position list 0 0.571  0.274   0.146 
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll (n=2,581; 40 municipalities).   
 
 
Multilevel multinomial regression explaining same sex voting 
 Full sample Women Men 
 Same-sex Cross-sex Same-sex Cross-sex Same-sex Cross-sex 
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Log likelihood -2,563.128      
Variance 0.019 
(0.022)  
    
Source: 2012 PARTIREP Exit Poll (n=2,581; 40 municipalities). Notes: Only respondents that have cast at least one 
preference vote are included. Results of a multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis. Reference category= Mixed 
vote. Unstandardized coefficients are presented with standard errors between brackets. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
